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STEPHEN NEWMAN: The next speaker is Professor Eric Janus of the
William Mitchell College of Law.
Prof Eric Janus
ERIC JANUS:659 Thank you very much for inviting me. I feel very
honored to be paired with Professor Brooks, and indeed, he stated my
argument very well, but I will state it a little bit further.
I am here, in part, because Minnesota actually was one of the
first states to have a civil commitment law, dating back to 1939, dealing
with sex offenders.66 That law was challenged and taken up to the
United States Supreme Court in Pearson v. Ramsey County.66' Among
the cases that were cited by the State of Minnesota in its successful
defense of the law was Buck v. Bell,662 the infamous case upholding the
forced sterilization of so-called mentally retarded people.663 Although
I do not have time to develop this theme, it seems clear to me that these
laws come out of the same context, and that is the use of the coercion of
the state to enforce some sort of notion having to do with mental
health.6 64
659 Professor, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota.
660 See generally Andrew Hammel, The Importance of Being Insane: Sexual
Predator Civil Commitment Law and the Idea of Sex Crimes as Insane Acts, 32 HOUs. L.
REv. 775, 776-77 ("Laws designed to allow state authorities to confine indefinitely people
with a history of violent sex crimes through civil mental health commitment have a long
history in the United States.... Minnesotapassed the first generationof these laws from the
1930's to the 1960's.").
661 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
662 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
663 Id. at 207.
6" See John Petrila, Ethics, Money, and the Problem of Coercion in Managed
BehavioralHealth, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 359, 393 (1996) ("Coercion plays an important role
in the mental health system. It theoretically enables the state to exercise its police and
112 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. [Vol. XIII
Professor Brooks characterized these laws, it is fair to say, as
being necessary because there are certain very dangerous sex offenders
who have "slipped through the cracks," of the criminal justice system.665
I think that is an accurate characterization of why these laws are in
place.
Another word for "cracks" are the guarantees of the United
States Constitution. These guarantees state that when a person is
sentenced to prison for a certain length of time, that person has to be let
out after that length of time is over.666 These guarantees also state that
we do not put people in prison in this country until it has been
adequately proven that they have committed a crime.667
What I would like to do is try to focus directly on what I think
are two of the key issues in both the constitutional and public policy
concerns about civil commitment.66 They do not have to do with
whether protecting the public from sexual violence is a compelling state
interest.669 It is clear that it is. 670 The key questions do not have to do
parens patriae powers in protecting individuals from themselves and the public from
individuals with mental disorders.").
5 See Zamoyski,supra note 535, at 1251. "[T]wo horrifying stories spurred the
respective state legislaturesto attempt different solutions to the problem of repeat violent sex
offenders who slip through the cracks of the criminal justice system." Id.
6 See Nancy K. Roden, Law and Psychiatry Part II: The Limits of Liberty:
Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness, and Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L. J. 375, 414
(1982) (pointing out that civil "commitment is similar to criminal confinement in that a
person's liberty is impaired").
I See Sonia Y. Lee, OC's PD's Feeling the Squeeze-The Right to Counsel: In
Light of Budget Cuts, Can the County Office of the Public Defender Provide Effective
Assistance of Counsel?, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1895, 1926 (1996) ("[F]undamental to the
viability of the criminaIjustice system is the ideal that all persons are innocent until proven
guilty.... The goal of the Constitution is not to convict as many defendantsas possible, but
rather to convict, after a fair and equitable trial, those persons found guilty of a crime.").
' See Earl-Hubbard, supra note 4, at 849. "The child sex offender registration
laws should do more than merely pass constitutionalmuster. They should prove to be good
policy." Id.
' See Doe v. Portiz, 662 A.2d 367, 412 (1995) (stating that "[tihe state interest in
protectingthe safety of members of the public from sex offenders is clear and compelling"),
1997] MEGAN'S LA W
with whether preventive detention is a constitutional technique. 67  As
Professor Brooks said, it is constitutional. 672  Civil commitment is
preventive detention.673 Certain forms of quarantine are preventive
detention.674 There have been other forms of preventive detention used
in this country as well.675 So, to argue about whether it is preventive
detention is not fruitful. The key issues here are not whether there have
been certain sex offenders who were sentenced to too short a sentence
or whether sometimes plea bargaining lets people out too early. 676 The
clear answer to those questions is yes, that is true.
The question is: what are the boundaries for the appropriate use
of preventive detention in our society and under our constitutional
system? Another way of putting that question is: under what
circumstances, under our constitutional system, under our system of a
belief in democracy, are we willing to throw off those guarantees of a
jury trial, of conviction, of due process, of ex post facto laws, and of
670 Id.
671 "The inescapable conclusion is that this Court found indefinite preventive
detention based solely on dangerousnessto be constitutionally acceptable." Hammel, supra
note 660, at 782 (citing Bailey v. Gardebring, 940 F.2d 1150 (8th Cir. 1989)).
672 See Brooks, supra note 568, at 752 (indicating that a civil commitment statute
satisfies constitutional requirements because it is designed to protect society against mentally
abnormal dangerous persons).
673 See Blacher,supra note 548, at 918; Roy E. Pardee II, Fear and Loathing in
Louisiana: Confining the Sane Dangerous Insanity Acquittee, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 223, 229
(1994).
674 See Kathleen M. Sullivan & Martha A. Field, AIDS and the Coercive Powers
of the State, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L.REv. 139, 145 (1988) ("[Q]uarantines resemble both the
civil commitment of the mentally ill or disabled and the preventive detention of criminal
suspects awaiting trial.").
675 See Sally Baumler, Appellate Review Under the Bail Reform Act, 1992 U. ILL.
L. REV. 483, 494 (1992) ("[P]reventive detention is used in involuntary commitment,
decisions setting the amount of bail, sentencing, national security,, and medical
quarantines.").
676 See Zamoyski, supra note 535, at 1296 (citing Nearly Half of Sex Offenders
Avoid Prison, SACRAMENTOBEE, May 31, 1994, at B8). "Prior sentences for sex offenders
have been relatively short although the offenses were quite violent." Id.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
double jeopardy? Under what circumstances are we willing to throw
those off and adopt sequentially, much looser procedures of the civil
commitment system? I agree with Professor Brooks also when he says
that every court that has looked at it, and I think everybody agrees, that
the formula that justifies preventive detention is dangerousness plus a
mental illness or mental disorder.677  Everybody agrees that
dangerousness alone is an unconstitutional basis for preventive
detention." 8 It has to be dangerousness plus something else.679 The
corollary of that is that the state's admittedly compelling interest in
protecting the public from sexual violence is insufficient to support
prevention detention.6"' Why? Because that is an interest that goes to
dangerousness alone, and that alone is insufficient.6"'
Rather, there has to be some sort of plus factor, something in
addition to the state's terribly strong interest in protecting women and
children from violence, some plus factor that puts the state over the
constitutional tripline.682 That plus factor has to be furnished by the
mental illness element.683 So if we want to ask what kinds of mental
illnesses or mental disorders will be sufficient to support preventive
detention, the answer has got to come, not from looking at the DSM, not
from asking the psychiatrists or the psychologists what they think a
mental disorder is, because they are not particularly expert in judging the
677 See Matthew J. Herman, Note, Are the Children of Illinois Protected from Sex
Offenders?, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REv., 883, 905 (citing Foucha, 504 U.S. 71). "Absent a
determination of current mental illness and dangerousness, continued confinement.. .[is]
impermissible." Foucha, 504 U.S. at 86.
678 But see United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (holding that
potential for danger is sufficient cause to detain without bail during pretrial period).
679 See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983) (stating that civil
commitment is permitted to "treat the individual's mental illness and to protect him and
society from his potential dangerousness").
6"0 Fujimoto,supra note 519, at 889 (stating that involuntary commitment of sex
offender who does not have a mental disorder is unconstitutional preventive detention).
681 Id.
682 Id. at 888-89.
68' Id. at 888.
114 [Vol. XIII
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constitutional balance that is at stake here,684 but from looking at what
role the mental illness or mental disorder element plays in this
constitutional calculus.6"5
There have been two key cases that have given us some hints
about this. The first is the Addington case, which is a United States
Supreme Court case that upheld civil commitment.6 6 In this case, the
Court held that civil commitment is a constitutional set of procedures.6 7
A state can have lowered procedural protections even though you are
depriving people of their liberty. 68  There were two possible
understandings from Addington.68 9 One is that because people were
684 See generally Sex Offenders Pose Threat, supra note 427, at A3 (quoting
president of the New Jersey Psychiatric Association, Dr. Daniel Greenwald, as saying "I
think it's really impossible for psychiatrists to know this person is no longer dangerous" in
reference to sex offenders); Morse, supra note 521, at 126-27. "The ability of mental health
professionals to predict future violence among mental patients may be better than chance,
but it is still highly inaccurate, especially if these professionals are attempting to use clinical
methods to predict serious violence." Id. at 126.
6" Morse, supra note 521, at 126-28.
I Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
61' See id. at 426, 433 (holding that civil commitment is constitutional because a
state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae power to protect its citizens and that
in the civil commitment hearings, states must provide clear and convincing evidence to meet
due process standards).
688 See id. at 425 (stating that civil commitment "constitutes a significant
deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection").
19 See Edward P. Richards, The Jurisprudence of Prevention: The Right of
SocietalSelf-Defense Against Dangerous Individuals, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 329, 355
(1989); John A. Washington, Prevention Detention: Dangerous Until Proven Innocent, 38
CATH. U. L. REv. 271, 278-79 (1988) (both law review articles discuss the two
understandingsfrom Addington: 1) that it is less harmful to improperly detain mentally ill
people because they might derive some therapeutic benefit from commitment, and 2) that the
lesser "clear and convincing" standard of proof is sufficient to involuntarily commit the
mentally ill because the courts decision is based on psychiatric evaluations, and not facts).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
mentally ill, depriving them of their liberty is less harmful to them than
depriving non-mentally ill people of their liberty. 90
A second possible understanding of Addington is that people
who are mentally ill have a lower entitlementto liberty than people who
are not mentally ill, and that is the reason why it is okay to lock them up
under lower standards than people who are not mentally ill. 691 The first
justification is a parens patriae justification.692 It assumes that the
mental illness produces some sort of incompetence in the individual.693
It also assumes a kind of benign system, where people are locked up for
treatment, but there are a lot of people who are concerned about them,
and if there is a mistake made, they will be let out soon.694 As I will
suggest in a moment, neither of those assumptions is true for sex
offenders.695
The second key case is the Foucha case.696 That case, I suggest,
stands for what I would call the principle of interstitiality. That is, the
criminal law has got to be the primary means of protecting the public
690 See Richards, supra note 689, at 355 (discussing how the value of liberty for
non-mentally ill people facing mistaken confinement is high, but the value of liberty "shifts"
for mentally ill people because those who are mentally ill who are improperly detained can
benefit by receiving treatment). But see Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 341 (1993) (Souter,
J., dissenting) (stating that it is not a presumption that curtailing the liberty of a disabled
person is less severe because of his disability).
691 See Washington,supra note 689, at 278-79 (stating that "due process warrants
a lesser standard of proof in proceedings to involuntary commit the mentally ill").
692 See Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
6 9 3 Id.
14 See generally id. at 428-29 (discussing the opportunities available in the event
erroneous confinement occurs).
69 See Marie A. Bochnewich, Prediction of Dangerousness and Washington's
Sexually Violent Predator Statute, 29 CAL. W. L. REv. 277, 303 (1992)(discussing that civil
commitment for sex offenders is unjustified under parens patriae power because due to a
lack of treatment "the released offender reemerges untreated to reoffend").
I Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
116 [Vol. XIII
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from any kind of violence, including sexual violence.6 97 The key issue
is whether the state can show some sort of additional interest in throwing
off the criminal law and using the secondary system of civil
commitment. Also, the question is whether, as I interpret Foucha and
understand that other people do not see it this way: does the mental
disorder somehow disable the state from using the criminal justice
system to vindicate its interest in protecting the public?69
If one looks at how that could be the case, one will see two
possibilities: one, the mental disorder might render somebody
incompetent to stand trial, and that is not in the parens patriae
rationale 699 The other possibility is that a mental disorder might render
somebody excused from criminal liability or unable to form a criminal
inten. 7 °° Those are the ways in which mental disorder disables the
state's ability to use the criminal justice system and, therefore, gives it
the heightened interest it needs to go outside of that system and use this
alternative system."'
697 See Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and
the FourteenthAmendment, 41 DUKE L. J. 507, 536 (1991) (addressing how the traditional
English Law has the legislature enact criminal laws to protect life and how the courts have
a duty to enforce the laws to protect society from violence).
69' See Ambiguities supra note 617, at 540 (stating that Foucha will continue the
trend in the years since United States v. Hinckley, Crim. No. 81-306 (D.D.C. June 21, 1982),
to restrict the category of excuse from criminal responsibilityon the basis of mental illness).
' See generally Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency and the
Implicationsfor Mental Health Law, I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 6, 27 (1995) [hereinafter
Side Effects ofIncompetencM (discussing how mental incompetency is required in order for
the government to assert the parens patriae power).
" See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §40.15 (McKinney 1996) ("[l~t is an affirmative
defense that when the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct, he lacked criminal
responsibilityby reason of mental disease or defect."); see also Amy L. Nelson, Postpartum
Psychosis: A New Offense? 95 DICK. L. REv. 625, 646 (1991) (discussing how jurisdictions
admit evidence of mental abnormality to negate elements of criminal intent).
7o' See Addington v..Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1978) (explainingthat the state has
a legitimate interest to care for individuals who are unable to care for themselves because
they have emotional disorders throughout civil commitments and that the state also has the
authority to protect the community from those with dangerous tendencies).
19971 117
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This is a key point illustrated in Professor Brooks' writing, if you
read the Washington State Supreme Court case of Young,72 and if you
read the Minnesota court case of Pearson."" They invoke this notion of
diminished responsibility.04 They do not necessarily label it as such, but
diminished responsibility is what they all refer to.70 5 Professor Brooks,
for example, maintains that not all mental disorders are appropriate for
civil commitment.0" "Only those," and I hope I am not misquoting him,
"which produce uncontrollable psychopathic rape are suitable for such
treatment.""7 7 The opinions in Young and Pearson indicate the same
utter inability to control.08 They all ring of a volitional dysfunction,
something that, at its extreme, would excuse people from criminal
liability.0 9
That I call the espoused justification for civil commitment, and
if you read how the courts and the writers justify using preventive
detention, that is, in the end, how they take that crucial step."'
What is the actual practice? Minnesota has a track record that
I have studied."' Unlike the State of Washington, where apparently
702 In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993).
"I Pearson v. P. Ct. of Ramsey County, 287 N.W. 297 (Minn. 1939).
71 See generally Young, 857 P.2d at 993-94; Pearson, 287 N.W. at 300.
705 Young, 857 P.2d at 993-94; Pearson, 287 N.W. at 300.
71 See Brooks, supra note 568, at 75 1.
707 Id. at 727-28.
708 Young, 857 P.2d at 1018; Pearson, 287 N.W. at 302.
71 See Deborah W. Denno, Gender Issues and the Criminal Law: Gender, Crime,
and the CriminalLaw Defenses; 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 80, 122 (1994) (stating that
a disability, such as a "defect in volition, because the actor cannot stop herself from violating
the law" may relieve one from responsibility).
710See Morse, supra note 521, at 117 (reviewing the justifications for preventive
detention and sexual predator commitment statutes).
711 See generally Conrad deFiebre, Psychopathic Sex Offenders Get New Home,
STAR TRIBUNE (Minnesota), Nov. 5, 1995, at BI (discussing the new Minnesota Sexual
Psychopathic Personality Treatment Center in the context of Minnesota's approach to civil
commitment).
118 [Vol. XIII
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there have been twenty-two people committed,712 in Minnesota there
have been seventy-five people committed under this law in the last five
years, from 1990 to 1995. 7' 3 In the modem history of the law since
1975, there have been ninety-four people committed, and it has picked
up in recent years.714 Of those people who have been committed, guess
how many have ever been discharged? None have ever come out of that
system. 7 5  There have been six people who have been so-called
"provisionally discharged." '716 Two went into the community,1 7 one
returned after a year,7"' and five got so old that they were discharged to
nursing homes.71 9
So what we are talking about is not the benign system that was
approved in Addington,720 where there are concerned doctors and family
looking out for people who have been railroaded 2' into a mental hospital
712 See Lied, supra note 525 (stating that the number of sexual predators confined
under the Washington statute has grown to 36).
7 13 Id.
714 Id.
"I Letter from John L. Kirwin, Assistant Attorney General, State of Minnesota, to
Eric Janus, Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law (Feb. 8, 1996). The letter
attaches charts which list the fate of patients who either were provisionally discharged,
transferred to prison, or died. Id. The letter and attached charts are on file with the New
York Law School Journal of Human Rights.
716 Id. at 4 (charting six provisionally discharged patients from 1975-1995).
717 "Two clients are on unauthorized absence." Id.
718 ld.
719 Id. "Often clients committed as psychopathic personalities who are on
provisional discharge, five are in state-operated nursing homes." Id.
720 Addington, 441 U.S. 418 ("[A] 'clear and convicing' standard of proof is
required by the Fourteenth Amendment in a civil proceeding brought under state law to
commit an individual involuntarily for an indefinite period to a state hospital.").
721 Id. at 420-21.
120 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XIII
these are life sentences,"2 and it is not surprising. Why? Because once
a judge has certified you as sexually dangerous, 723 who in their right
mind would ever certify you as being safe? No one will ever do that.724
So the first conclusion is that this is not an Addington case.725
Second, none of the ninety people who have been committed in
Minnesota have ever been found to be incompetent. 726 That is not a
722 See Sarah H. Francis, Sexually Dangerous Person Statutes: Constitutional
Protections of Society and the Mentally lll or Emotionally-DrivenPunishment?, 29 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 125, 128 (1995) (asserting that "because neither psychologists nor legislatures
have clinically defined sexual dangerousness. . . [m]ost persons classified as sexually
dangerous find themselves confined for life"). See also Hammel, supra note 660, at759
(indicatingthat "the real motivation for [sexual predator civil commitment laws] was lifetime
incarceration .. "). Butsee In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Mass. 1994) ("[l~t is not
clear that treatment for psychopathological personality never works. . . [blut even when
treatment is problematic, and it often is, the state's interest in the safety of others is no less
legitimate and compelling ....").
723 A court will usually determine whether an individual is sexually dangerous
based on expert testimony and its own review of the background of the person charged. See
generallyIn re Linehan, 544 N.W.2d 308, 313-14 (Minn. 1996) (stating that reliance on such
expert testimony comports with a state's burden of proof in a civil commitment case); see
also MINN. STAT. ANN. §253B. 185(l)(West 1996) (prescribingcourt review of all petitions
prepared by the county attorney that allege a proposed patient is sexually dangerous).
724 See C. Peter Erlinder, Minnesota's Gulag: Involuntary Treatment for the
"PoliticallyIll," 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 99, 101-02 (1993) ("Because a person committed
as a'psychopathicpersonality' has never been found to suffer from a medically recognized
illness, he may never gain release by a determination that he has been 'cured.' Rather, the
commitmentas a 'psychopathicpersonality' is based upon facts that, once having occurred,
provide an ongoing justification for involuntary confinement.").
725 Addingtonv. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). In this case concerning a request by
a mother to commit her son to a mental institution because of his alleged mental incapacity,
the Supreme Court held that involuntary commitment for an indefinite period based on
mental incapacity and dangerousness to others requires a "clear and convincing" standard
of proof. Id
726 See, e.g., deFiebre, supra note 711 (stating that most of Minnesota's recently
civilly committed sex offenders, comprised of ninety-five men and one woman, "have no
psychiatric diagnosis at all . [and] most have average or above-average intelligence ...
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finding in any of these cases. This is not a parens patriae situation.727
Third, in committing people, the courts do not limit their commitments
to people who have a volitional dysfunction of some sort.72 ' They are
not limiting these people to those who are not prosecutable for crimes.729
Many of the people committed, including my client, Dennis Linehan,73 °
have a diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder.7 1' That is an
... See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990) (defining parens patriae
as "the principal that the state must care for those who cannot take care of themselves, such
as minors who lack proper care and custody from their parents"). For a discussion of the
evolution of the doctrine of parens patriae, see Neil H. Cogan, Juvenile Law: Before and
After the Entrance of the Parens Patriae, 22 S.C.L. REv. 147, 151-61 (1970); see also In re
Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 924 (Minn. 1994) (Wahl, J., dissenting) (explaining that since
a mental illness is not required in order to civilly commit a person under Minnesota's
commitment statute, the state's argument that it is acting pursuant to its parens patriae
interest is not valid).
728 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §253B.02(18)(b)(3) (b) (West 1995). "For
purposes of [the Civil Commitment Act], it is not necessary to prove that the person has an
inability to control the person's sexual impulses." Id. For a discussion about the relationship
between volition and behavior, see Kevin W. Saunders, Voluntary Acts and the Criminal
Law, 49 U. PITT. L. REv. 443 (1988).
729 Individuals in Minnesota, for example, have been. subject to both criminal
prosecution and subsequent civil commitment. See, e.g., In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910
(Minn. 1994). Prior to his civil commitment, Blodgett was in prison for two counts of
criminal sexual conduct in the second degree. Id. In re Linehan, 544 N.W.2d 308 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1996). Prior to his civil commitment, Linehan had been in prison for murder and
kidnaping. Id.
73 In re Linehan, 544 N.W.2d 308. Appellant, Dennis Linehan, was convicted as
a sexually dangerous person after he pleaded guilty to the charge of kidnaping in satisfaction
of an indictmentfor murder and kidnaping. Id. Prior to his parole, Linehan was committed
for an indeterminate period as a psychopathic personality. Id. Although the Minnesota
Supreme Court reversed the commitment, he was later successfully committed under the
newly-enactedsexually dangerousperson statute (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02(18)(b)(West
1995)) because he exhibited a personality disorder, an impulse control disorder, and an anti-
social personality disorder. Id.
73' "To support an antisocial personalitydisorder diagnosis... the trial court found
Linehan had shown: a failure to conform to social norms. .. deceitfulness... irritability
and aggressiveness... consistent reckless disregard for the safety of others.., and lack of
remorse...." Id. at 313; see also DSM-IV, supra note 606 (defining Anti-social Personality
Disorder as, inter alia, "a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of
122 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XIII
extremely broad diagnosis 32 Basically, it means that you have a history
of bad behavior733 which some people say is applicable to 80 percent of
people in prison."' So, essentially, if these laws are upheld, the basic
principle involved is applicable to eighty percent of the people in
prison.73 The principle underlying these laws, therefore, could swallow
the whole criminal justice system.736
Let me give you just a very brief summary of some of the
characteristics of people who have been committed under the Minnesota
law.737 I am going back to 1940 when this law was first enacted, 738 but
it is the same law. 73 9 This is apparently what it meant then: persistent
window peeping and exhibitionism, sexual contact with cows, fondling
of strange children, excessive masturbation, consenting homosexual
others.... [D]eceit and manipulation are central features....
732 See, e.g., DSM-IV, id.
713 "Individuals with Anti-social Personality Disorder fail to conform to social
norms...", Id. "They may repeatedly perform acts that are grounds for arrest such as
destroying property, harassing others, stealing, or pursuing illegal occupations." Id. at 646.
114 See Abraham L. Halpern, The Insanity Verdict, The Psychopath and Post-
Acquittal Confinement, 24 PAC. L.J. 1125, n.68 (1993) (citing Robert Hare, et al.,
Psychopathy and the DSM-IV Criteria for Anti-social Personality Disorder, 100 J.
ABNORMAL PSYCHOL., 1-8 (1991)) (stating that "Hare and his colleagues have shown that
seventy-five to eighty percent of convicted felons warrant the diagnosis of Anti-social
Personality Disorder..
735 Id
736 See, e.g., FeliciaG. Rubenstein,Note, Committing Crimes While Experiencing
a True Disassociative State: The Multiple Personality Defense and Appropriate Criminal
Responsibility 38 WAYNE L. REv. 353, 371-72 (1991) (arguing that if anti-social personality
disorders were to be routinely considered, the whole criminal justice system would break
down since the only criteria for the disorder is engaging in criminal activity; therefore, all
defendants could be deemed mentally ill).
731 MINN. STAT. ANN. §253B.02 (West 1995).
731 1939 MmN. LAWS 369.
711 See, e.g., In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 919 (Minn. 1994) (asserting that
"since the legislature, in response to the report from the Governor's committee on the Care
of Insane Criminals and Sex Crimes...passed the first Psychopathic Personality Statute in
1939, the definition of the term 'psychopathic personality' has remained essentially
unchanged...").
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contact with adults, sexual contact with boys, indecent exposure, et
cetera.74° These laws are exceedingly elastic, and whomever happens to
be the dangerous deviant person dujour is subject to being committed,
potentially for life, under these laws. 4
The proceedings are also error prone because of their
dependance on predictions 742 Now, Professor Brooks indicates that Dr.
Quinsey in Canada says eighty percent of predictions can be correct.743
We could go on at length, but in one minute I shall say that he was using
74 See id. at 920 n.6 (citing Dr. William Erickson, The Psychopathic Personality
Statute, Need for Change, at 20-26 (1991) (unpublished paper presented by the
Commissioner of Human Services to the legislature in 1991). "[P]ersons have been
committed as psychopathic personalities for a wide range of behaviors, including window
peeping, excessive masturbation, sexual contact with cows, homosexuality, incest,
pedophilia, and rape." Id.
741 See generally Zamoyski, supra note 535, at 1253-54 (discussing California's
"one strike" law (CAL. PENAL CODE §667.61) which sets up a road map for the severity of
the punishment imposed for committing sex offenses). In contrast, Washington's Sexual
Violent PredatorsAct (WASH. REv. CODE. ANN. §71.09) allows "indefinite confinement of
sexually violent predators who do not necessarily have a psychiatrically recognized mental
disease or defect." Id. at 1257. Under Washington'slaw, a sexual predator is someone who
has previously been convicted of a violent sexual crime and suffers from a "'mental
abnormality' or 'personality disorder' that makes him likely to engage in predatory acts of
violence." Id.
742 Prediction error rates can be decreased by "including sex offense history,
psychopathy and phallometrically measured sexual preferences as predictors." Vernon L.
Quinsey, et al., Actuarial Prediction ofSexual Recidivism, 10 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE
85, 103 (1995) [hereinafter Actuarial Prediction].
... Vernon L. Quinsey is a professor of psychology and the coordinator of
forensic/correctionalstudiesat Queens University in Kingston, Ontario, Canada. Id. at 105.
According to Dr. Quinsey, "using theoretically relevant and empirically tested predictors,
predictive accuracy [of sexual recidivism] can realistically be expected to be in the 80
percent range." In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1003-04 (Wash. 1993) (quoting Vernon L.
Quinsey, Review ofthe Washington State Special Commitment Center Program for Sexually
Violent Predators, at 9) (appended to Wash. State Inst. for Pub. Policy, Review of Sexual
Predator Program: Community Protection Research Project, (Feb. 1992)).
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an actuarial formula 44 that makes use of phalometric measurements,745
together with a very specific test, the "Psychopathy Checklist
Revised.'1 46 They found that those two things taken together are highly
predictive, up to 80 percent accurate.7 ' Yet, when you take that eighty
percent and apply it to the fairly low base rate of recidivism,748 and you
check to see what the false positive rate is,749 that is where the errors
come in. I do not have time to explain it thoroughly right now, but you
will see that clinicians, who cannot be as scientifically accurate as the
actuarial tables, 75  are going to be less accurate than that eighty
percent.75' When they do their guesswork on the actual population and
744 See generallyActuarialPredictiorz supra note 742 (explainingthat the actuarial
formula accounts for such variables as criminal histories, sexual preference data, and
outcome variables). Calculations were made using what is referred to as a Recidivism
Prediction Instrument. Id. at 97.
143 "Phallometry(or penile plethysmography) is a technique for measuring penile
erection in response to a variety of stimuli, used with many procedural variations in different
sex offender assessment centers." G. Launay, The Phallometric Assessment of Sex
Offenders: Some Professionaland Research Issues, CRIM. BEHAV. MENT. IEALTH 48 (1994).
746 The Psychopathy Checklist is a device "strongly related to criminal conduct
[with a] high interrater reliability." Actuarial Prediction, supra note 742, at 87.
Psychopathy is considered the "best predictor of violent recidivism in a maximum security
psychiatric sample." Id.
... See generally id. and accompanying text.
741 See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1269 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a recidivist as a
"habitual criminal ... [who makes a] trade of crime").
9 False positives are "those incorrectly classified as dangerous." Actuarial
Prediction, supra note 742, at 100.
750 Predictions based solely on a clinician's analysis "may be suboptimal ......
Vernon L. Quinsey & Anne Maguire, Maximum Security Psychiatric Patients, Actuarialand
ClinicalPrediction ofDangerousnesS 1 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 143, 145 (1986); see
also Francis, supra note 722, at 139 (stating that "inaccuracy primarily stems from the
inherent vagueness of the dangerousness element, which is subject to a variety of
interpretations").
75 See, e.g., Morse, supra note 521, at 126 (stating that "the ability of the mental
health professionals to predict future violence among mental patients may be better than
chance, but it is still highly inaccurate, especially if the professionals are attempting to use
clinical methods to predict serious violence").
